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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellants, Thurston Cable 
Construction and/or Freemont Compensation, is from a tentative finding 
of permanent total disability dated May 30, 2003. As explained below, 
Utah Administrative Rule 612-l-10(C)(l)(c) provides that "a preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability by the Labor Commission or 
the Appeals Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate 
review." This is an exception to the final judgment rule. Therefore, this 
appeal is from a final agency action. This Court has jurisdiction over 
final agency actions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-
46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review this 
appeal? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law that the 
Court must review under a correctness standard. See McCoy v. Utah 
Disaster Kleenup.. 2003 UT App 49, f 9. 
1 
Issue 2: Did the Commission err in concluding that a person with 
a 0% impairment has a "significant impairment" under section 35-1-67 
(a.k.a., 34A-2-413),1 U.C.A.? This issue was preserved at R. 223. 
Standard of Review: The meaning of the term "significant 
impairment" involves a matter of statutory interpretation. The Labor 
Commission does not have a general grant of discretion under section 
34A-1-301, U.C.A., nor does it have a specific grant of discretion under 
section 34A-2-413. Therefore, a "correction of error" standard applies. 
See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777. When reviewing 
a question of law, the Court gives "no deference to the trial judge's or 
agency's determination, because the appellate court has 'the power and 
duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout 
the jurisdiction.'" IcL 
Issue 3: Did the Commission err in determining that the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident was the "direct cause" of Mr. 
DeMille's permanent total disability under section 34A-2-413, U.C.A.? 
This issue was preserved at R. 223. 
1
 This provision is currently codified at 34A-2-413(l)(b), U.C.A. (2004). 
Both provisions are identical in substance. Therefore, the most recent code 
section will be referenced for the remainder of this brief. 
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Standard of Review. This involves a mixed question. The 
interpretation of the term "direct causation" is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, reviewed for correctness. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n. 
2000 UT 66, f 13, 7 P.3d 777. Review of the Commission's underlying 
factual findings regarding direct causation is reviewed under the 
substantial evidence standard. See Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 872 
P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Issue 4: Did the Commission correctly rule that Mr. DeMille met 
his burden of proving that the industrial accident at Thurston Cable is 
the medical cause of his low back condition? This issue was preserved at 
R. 223-24. 
Standard of Review. This involves a mixed question. Whether the 
Commission applied the correct law is a legal question reviewed under a 
"correction of error" standard. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 
66, 1f 13, 7 P.3d 777. Review of the Commission's underlying factual 
findings regarding medical causation is reviewed under the substantial 
evidence standard. See Chase v. Industrial Comm'n. 872 P.2d 475 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Whether the Commission violated Thurston's Equal 
Protection Clause rights constitutes a conclusion of law, reviewed for 
3 
correctness. See Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 842 P.2d 928 
(UtahCt. App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The relevant statute on the date of the injury, section 34A-2-413 
U.C.A., provides as follows: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show 
by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or 
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial 
accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the 
permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the 
commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or 
combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused 
impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the work activities for which 
the employee has been qualified until the time of 
4 
the industrial accident or occupational disease 
that is the basis for the employee's permanent 
total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work 
reasonably available, taking into consideration the 
employee's age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (emphasis added). 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers 
Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers' compensation for 
industrial accidents, reads as follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured . 
. . by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury . . . 
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services . . . 
[and] medicines . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. 
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-
23 (Utah 1986), to require a claimant to prove both medical and legal 
causation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
This case presents the question of an employee's entitlement to 
workers' compensation benefits. In particular, entitlement to one type of 
workers' compensation indemnity benefits - permanent total disability 
benefits, which are benefits that would be due to the claimant, as wage 
replacement, for the rest of his life. The underlying facts of this case are 
not in dispute. 
On March 7, 1986 Mr. Kirk DeMille sustained a low back injury 
while working for the Granger-Hunter Improvement District ("Granger-
Hunter"). See Kirk DeMille v. Granger-Hunter Improvement District, 
Labor Comm'n Case No. 86000508 (1987); R. at 1-15. That accident 
occurred when Mr. DeMille was attempting to fix a fire hydrant with a 
pipe wrench, and while doing so, injured his low back. On May 13, 1986 
Mr. DeMille had low back surgery. Dr. Home removed a herniated disc 
at L4-5 and fused that level. See R. 229, at 55. Mr. DeMille reported 
that he did not work following the low back surgery until October 1990, a 
period of more than four years. Mr. DeMille filed for workers' 
compensation benefits as a result of that event. Administrative Law 
Judge Richard Sumsion held that Mr. DeMille had a 12.75% permanent 
6 
impairment that pre-dated the March 7, 1986 accident at Granter-
Hunter Improvement District, attributable to degenerative disease of the 
spine. See R. at 4-9. He also found that Mr. DeMille had a 4.25% 
permanent partial impairment rating attributable to the March 7 1986 
industrial event. See id. Therefore, Mr. DeMille had a 17% whole person 
impairment prior to September 14, 1995. There is no dispute as to these 
facts. 
On September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille slipped and fell off of a front-
end loader while working for Thurston Cable thus aggravating his pre-
existing low back condition. See R. at 16. Mr. DeMille did not receive any 
permanent partial impairment rating for this industrial injury (the 
"Industrial Injury"). See R. 229, at 401. In other words, there was no 
significant organ or body system functional consequences as a result of 
this event. See infra. 
Mr. DeMille returned to work following the Industrial Injury. Mr. 
DeMille began working for Danny Bundy Excavation from November 
1996 until August 1997 where he worked as a truck driver and heavy 
equipment operator. Mr. DeMille later worked at Hurst Stores from July 
1998 until October 1998. He has not worked since that time. 
7 
On November 9, 2000 Mr. DeMille filed an Application for Hearing 
claiming entitlement to medical expenses, recommended medical care 
and temporary total disability compensation. See R. at 19. In lieu of a 
hearing, the ALJ referred the case to a medical panel upon stipulation of 
the parties. ALJ Sims entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on August 8, 1997. See R. at 23.2 A hearing was later held 
on April 3, 2001 on the issue of additional temporary total disability. See 
R. at 121. The ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on January 2, 2002. See R. at 120-130. 
On June 5, 2001 Mr. DeMille filed another Application for Hearing 
alleging entitlement to permanent total disability benefits as a result of 
the September 14, 1995 industrial accident at Thurston Cable. See R. at 
93. Thurston Cable has continuously asserted that this Industrial Injury 
did not cause Mr. DeMille to become permanently totally disabled since 
he failed to meet two of the necessary statutory requirements, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413, and because the 1995 industrial accident 
was not the medical cause of his current low back condition. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on May 13, 2002 before 
Administrative Law Judge Richard M. LaJeunesse. See R. at 143. The 
2
 Although that case is referred to as Case No. 96920, it is the same 
as the present action. 
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focus of the hearing was whether Mr. DeMille was permanently totally 
disabled as a result of the September 14, 1995 injury and medical 
causation. See R. at 165, 233. After the hearing Mr. DeMille submitted 
additional medical records to which Thurston Cable objected. See R. 
152-164. 
On November 6, 2002 the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (the "ALJ's Order"). See R. at 165-180. 
The ALJ concluded that the Industrial Injury at Thurston Cable caused 
Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413. See id. The ALJ concluded that even though Mr. DeMille 
had a 17% whole person permanent impairment rating prior to the injury 
at Thurston Cable, and had no permanent impairment rating for the 
Industrial Injury at Thurston Cable, Mr. DeMille had met his burden 
under the permanent total disability statute of showing a significant 
impairment caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial accident. See 
id. The ALJ further found that his industrial injury at Thurston Cable 
was the "direct cause" of his permanent total disability, thus meeting the 
additional statutory requirement. See id. The ALJ made no finding 
regarding whether the industrial injury at Thurston Cable was the 
medical cause of his current low back condition. See id. Also, the ALJ 
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disallowed the submission of the additional medical records contained in 
R. 153-162 and 201-210 by Dr. Jonathan Home.3 
Thurston Cable subsequently filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's 
Order and Mr. DeMille filed a response. See R. 185, 217. On May 30, 
2003, the Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for Review and 
Order of Remand (the "Commission's Order") affirming the ALJ's Order. 
See R. 222. No further action has been had at the Labor Commission 
level. 
On June 27, 2003, Thurston Cable filed a Petition for Review of the 
Commission's Order. A Docketing Statement was filed on August 5, 
2003. 
On December 15, 2003 Mr. DeMille filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction. Thurston Cable filed its Response to Motion to 
Dismiss on December 31, 2003. Mr. DeMille filed a Reply to Response to 
Motion to Dismiss on January 16, 2004. Thereafter, on January 27, 
2004 the Court of Appeals issued an Order. In this Order, the Court 
ruled that the jurisdictional motion was deferred for plenary 
presentation. 
Notwithstanding this disallowance, these documents are inserted in 
the record. 
10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This is a case where the Labor Commission incorrectly awarded 
worker's compensation benefits. Against its own precedent and standard 
Commission practice, the Commission incorrectly concluded that Mr. 
DeMille met the necessary statutory requirements for a permanent total 
disability award. In making its findings, the Commission incorrectly 
interpreted the relevant statute in several instances. Most significant is 
the Commission's error in permitting a person with a 0% permanent 
impairment rating to meet the relevant statute's "significant impairment" 
standard. To hold a carrier/employer liable for lifetime benefits which 
could range in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, under such facts, 
belies the statutory mandate of a "significant impairment" which relates 
to the industrial injury. Respondents respectfully submit that a 0% 
impairment rating cannot meet the requirement of a "significant 
impairment.'' 
In the same vein, the Commission also erred in interpreting and 
applying the direct causation standard, given that the impetus of Mr. 
DeMille's permanent total disability claim stems from his significant (17% 
whole body) pre-existing condition. 
11 
Finally, the Commission compounded its error in failing to apply 
properly the medical causation test articulated by the Utah Court of 
Appeals and in Professor Larson's leading treatise. The error in this 
regard signifies an Equal Protection Clause violation and immediate 
reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Mr. DeMille submits in his Motion to Dismiss that this appellate 
Court lacks jurisdiction since the Utah Labor Commission's May 30, 
2003 Order Denying Motion for Review is based upon the affirmance of 
the ALJ's November 6, 2002 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order which was a preliminary determination of permanent total 
disability. 
Section 63-46b-16(l) of the Utah Code states that the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review "all final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings." Similarly, section 78-2a-3(2)(a) of the 
Utah Code provides that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over "the 
final orders and decrees resulting from final adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies . . . " Petitioner is certainly correct that the ALJ's Order 
and, therefore, the Commission's Order rests on a tentative finding of 
12 
permanent total disability. However, Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-
10(C)(1)(c) provides that a tentative finding of permanent total disability 
is a "final agency action" for purposes of review by the Court of Appeals. 
This Rule provides: "A preliminary determination of permanent total 
disability by the Labor Commission or the Appeals Board is a final 
agency action for purposes of appellate review." kL (emphasis added). 
This is an exception to the well-recognized final judgment rule. 
In R.H.D. v. S.F. (In re Baby K.). 967 P.2d 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), the appellate court held that as one the exceptions to the final 
judgment rule, "a party may appeal an interlocutory order if a governing 
statute so provides." kL Here the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
("UARA"), section 63-46a-9.6 of the Utah Code, allows for the creation of 
the Utah Administrative Code. Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-104 
gives the Labor Commission the power to adopt rules, such as Rule 612-
1-10(C)(1)(c). Given this authority, the Utah Administrative Code 
sufficiently allows for an exception to the final judgment rule for tentative 
permanent total disability findings and gives the appellate court 
jurisdiction to hear this case. This provision was enacted on March 20, 
13 
2001 and remains in effect today.4 In any event, this administrative rule 
would have no meaningful effect if it were not applied in this instance. 
Thurston Cable also notes that its position is not inconsistent with 
the principles recently articulated in Thomas v. Color Country, 2004 UT 
12, since the Supreme Court in that case was addressing whether an 
interim finding of permanent total disability was a final order for 
purposes of subsistence payments. In Color Country, the Court held that 
a tentative finding of permanent total disability was not a final order for 
purposes of subsistence payment orders. IcL at ^f 25-26. Here, however, 
the Court is asked to address whether the interim order is a final agency 
action for purposes of appellate review. Since there is clear Utah 
authority on point (i.e., Rule 612-l-10(C)(l)(c)), Thurston Cable submits 
that jurisdiction is proper in this appeal. 
POINT 2: THE COMMISSION INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR, 
DEMILLE'S 0% IMPAIRMENT CONSTITUTES A 
"SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT" UNDER THE PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY STATUTE 
The Commission correctly observed that Mr. DeMille has a 17% 
permanent impairment for his pre-existing low back condition. The 
4
 Rule 612-l-10(C)(l)(c) of the Utah Administrative Code was enacted 
on March 20, 2001 and has remained unchanged since. It is a procedural 
change in the law and thus has retroactive effect. 
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Commission also correctly observed that Mr. DeMille received no 
additional impairment rating for the September 14, 1995 Industrial 
Accident. In other words, the Commission and the ALJ found that Mr. 
DeMille was assigned a 0% impairment rating for the September 14, 
1995 Industrial Accident. Notwithstanding the undisputed fact that Mr. 
DeMille did not have any permanent partial impairment attributable to 
the Industrial Injury, the Commission concluded that Mr. DeMille 
sustained a "significant impairment" as a result of the Industrial Injury, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i). Thurston Cable 
stresses that a person with a 0% permanent impairment rating cannot 
satisfy the statutory standard of "significant impairment". 
A. Defining inability to work as a significant impairment 
obliterates section 35-l-67(b)(i), U.C.A. 
It is first important to address the Commission's error in confusing 
and compounding two statutory requirements into one. I.e., sections 
34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) and 34A-2-413(l)(c)(i). 
The applicable law, 34A-2-413(l), Utah Code Ann., establishes 
three distinct and separate requirements for permanent total disability. 
First, the employee must have either a "significant impairment" or 
"combination of impairments" as a result of the claimed industrial 
accident. Second, the employee must be "permanently totally disabled". 
15 
And third, the industrial accident must be the "direct cause" of the 
employee's permanent total disability. These three distinct requirements 
- Impairment, Disability, and Causation - precede any award of 
permanent total disability. 
The relevant statute, section 34A-2-413(l), U.C.A., specifically 
provides as follows: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show 
by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or 
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial 
accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the 
permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled [under 
prong (ii)], the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or 
combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused 
impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the work activities for which 
the employee has been qualified until the time of 
the industrial accident or occupational disease 
16 
that is the basis for the employee's permanent 
total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work 
reasonably available, taking into consideration the 
employee's age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l) (emphasis added). 
As observed above, the disability prong, subsection (c), establishes 
four required factual determinations. The first is that the employee is 
"not gainfully employed". In other words, the employee is not currently 
working regularly, earning income at least equivalent to the current state 
average weekly wage or the claimant's wage he earned on the week of 
injury. See Utah Admin. Code R. 612-1-10(D). What the ALJ and 
Commission have done in this case is use the "not gainfully employed" 
requirement under the disability prong to satisfy the "significant 
impairment" prong. The ALJ stated, and the Commission agreed, that 
because the Industrial Injury brought him from "employability" to 
unemployability, the "significant impairment" standard was met. See R. 
at 174. This erroneous interpretation makes the first prong as 
established by the legislature unnecessary because it is satisfied by one 
of four tests in the second prong. It is elementary statutory construction 
that each part of a list of compulsory statutory requirements is distinct 
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and different from the others. See, e.g. Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 856 P.2d 648 (Utah Ct. App.1993). 
Allowing the "significant impairment" standard to be satisfied by 
the "gainful employment" test violates the principles of statutory 
construction. The ALJ and Commission are simply incorrect to conclude 
that the lack of gainful employment after the accident satisfies the 
"significant impairment" test.5 
B. A Zero Percent Impairment Rating is Not A "Significant 
Impairment". 
The most troubling error in this case is the Commission's 
conclusion that a 0% impairment meets the statutory standard of 
"significant impairment". 
Section 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i), requires that an injured worker have an 
"impairment" from the claimed industrial event. Moreover, the statute 
5Although Thurston Cable agrees that Mr. DeMille is not currently 
employed, Thurston Cable contends that the facts do not compel the 
conclusion that the ALJ and Commission reaches. Mr. DeMille had a 
significant period of over four years in which he did not work following his 
low back fusion. Mr. DeMille worked as a truck driver and heavy 
equipment operator from November 1996 through August 1997. And, he 
worked at Hurst Stores from July through October 1998. This too calls into 
question the connection between his lack of work now and the September 
1995 accident. 
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provides a qualifying term — that impairment be "significant".6 The 
dispute in this case regards whether Mr. DeMille's impairment from the 
Industrial Accident is "significant". See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(b)(i). In this case, the Commission determined that the claimant 
has a "significant impairment" even though there was no impairment 
rating assigned. The Commission stated on this point: 
The Commission notes that Thurston's argument that Mr. 
DeMille's impairment cannot be considered significant 
because it has never been rated by a physician. While such a 
rating would have been helpful in this case, and might be 
essential in other cases, 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) (aka 35-1-67) only 
requires a "significant impairment", not a "significant 
impairment rating." In light of the facts and medical opinion 
submitted in this case, the Commission agrees with Judge La 
Jeunesse that Mr. DeMille has established a significant 
impairment. 
R. at 223. 
Before considering whether the claimant has a "significant" 
impairment from the Industrial Accident, it is helpful to first address the 
meaning of the term "impairment". Under Utah law, an "impairment" is 
defined by statute as "a purely medical condition reflecting any 
anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. Impairment can be 
temporary or permanent, industrial or non-industrial." Utah Code 
6
 Alternatively, a claimant will satisfy the Impairment standard if he 
shows a "combination of impairments." This factor was not addressed 
below and, therefore, is not at issue here. 
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Ann. § 34A-2-102(8) (emphasis added); see Crosland v. Board of Rev, of 
Ind. Comm'n, 828 P.2d 528, n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).7 
The AMA Guides, applicable in workers compensation proceedings, 
see Utah Admin. Code R. 612-7-3, define this term consistent with Utah 
statutory law: 
The Guides continue[] to define impairment as 'a loss, loss of 
use, or derangement of any body part, organ system, or organ 
function/ . . . A medical impairment can develop from an . . . 
injury. . . . An impairment is considered permanent when it 
has reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), meaning 
it is well stabilized and unlikely to change substantially in the 
next year with our without medical treatment. The term 
impairment in the Guides refers to permanent impairment, 
which is the focus of the Guides. . . . 
According to the Guides, determining whether an injury . . . 
results in a permanent impairment requires a medical 
assessment performed by a physician. An impairment may 
lead to functional limitations or the inability to perform 
activities of daily living. . . . 
In evaluating impairment, the Guides consider both anatomic 
and functional loss. . . Anatomic loss refers to damage to the 
organ system or body structure, while functional loss refers to 
a change in function for the organ or body system. 
7
 By contrast, "disability" is defined by Utah's worker's compensation 
statute as "becoming medically impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-102(6); see Crosland. supra. 
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American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition at 2, 4.8 In short, the AMA Guides 
assess the degree to which there is anatomic and functional loss {i.e., 
impairment) by assessing a designated impairment percentage (i.e., from 
0% to 100%). Although not well-defined by Utah case-law, "significant" 
in the context of the Workers Compensation Act's "significant 
impairment" requirement has always referred to a ratable impairment. 
8
 In regard to "disability", the AMA Guides, Fifth Edition provide: 
The term disability . . refer[s] to the specific activity or role the 
"disabled" individual is unable to perform. . . . The Guides 
continue[] to define disability as an alteration of an individual's 
capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands or 
statutory or regulatory requirements because of an impairment. 
. . . An impairment evaluation, however, is only one aspect of 
disability determination. A disability determination also 
includes information about the individual's skills, education, job 
history, adaptability, age and environment requirements and 
modifications. . . . An individual with a medical impairment can 
have no disability for some occupations, yet be very disabled for 
others. 
AMA Guides, Fifth Edition at 8. Simply put, the degree of industrial 
disability can be much different than the degree of impairment because 
industrial disability references to loss of earning capacity and impairment 
references to anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. The Court of 
Appeals has stated that a disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in 
terms of the specific individual who has suffered a work-related injury. See 
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). For instance, an 
injury to a hand would not cause the same degree of disability in a teacher 
as it would in an electrician. Id. 
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See e.&._, W.C. v. Magnesium Corp. dba Renco, Labor Comm'n Case No. 
97-0583 (5/21/02), attached. This requirement is consistent with the 
AMA Guides which indicate that the "severity" of an impairment, or 
functional limitation, is reflected by an impairment rating. The AMA 
Guides read as follows: 
Impairment percentages or ratings developed by medical 
specialists are consensus-derived estimates that reflect the 
severity of the medical condition and the degree to which 
the impairment decreases an individual's ability to perform 
common activities of daily living, excluding work. Impairment 
ratings were designed to reflect functional limitations and not 
disability. The whole person impairment percentages listed in 
the Guides estimate the impact of the impairment on the 
individual's overall ability to perform activities of daily living, 
excluding work . . . 
The AMA Guides clearly indicate that a person with a 0% 
impairment rating does not have a significant impairment since there is 
no significant anatomic or functional loss. The AMA Guides read: 
A 0% whole person (WP) impairment is assigned to an 
individual with an impairment if the impairment has no 
significant organ or body system functional consequences 
and does not limit the performance of the common activities 
of daily living indicated in Table 1-2. A 90% to 100% WP 
indicates a very severe organ or body system impairment 
requiring the individual to be fully dependent on others for 
self-care, approaching death. 
AMA Guides at 4-5. 
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Similarly, the Utah 2002 Impairment Guides, applicable in Utah 
Worker's Compensation Proceedings, state that "the standard 
impairment schedule considers percentage of loss on an arbitrary 
continuum with 0% reflecting no residual or loss and 100% equaling a 
state approaching death." Utah 2002 Impairment Guides at 5. 
The Commission recently held in Crafts v. Yellow Freight Systems, 
Labor Comm'n 99-0291 & 99-0292 (7/30/03), attached, that the term 
"significant impairment" requires a "permanent impairment". By the 
term "permanent", the Commission obviously had in mind a measurable 
rating. Interestingly, the Commission does not seem to be following its 
own statutory interpretation. Thus, although the term "impairment" 
does not itself require a rating by the fact that an "impairment" can be 
"temporary" or "permanent" as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
102(8), the qualifying term "significant" certainly requires a something 
more than a 0% rating. 
Even if this Court agrees with the Commission's determination that 
Mr. DeMille has an "impairment" from the Industrial Accident — since 
the Court found the Industrial Accident caused muscle scarring and 
spine and soft tissue damage, reflecting anatomical and functional losses 
—, the issue squarely before the Court of Appeals is whether Mr. DeMille, 
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even if having these "impairments" from the industrial accident, has a 
"significant* one.9 Thurston Cable submits that the medical evidence in 
this case does not satisfy this standard given the ALJ and Commission's 
finding of a 0% impairment rating. 
Indeed, the Commission's finding of a 0% impairment means that 
there is no significant organ or body system functional consequences and 
that the claimant is not limited in the performance of the common 
activities of daily living indicated in Table 1-2 of the AMA Guides. Given 
this clearly defined meaning, there is no logical basis to then conclude 
contrary to that finding as the Commission did here. Logically speaking, 
one of these underlying findings must be clearly erroneous. 
Thurston Cable will not belabor the obvious point that a 0% 
impairment can never be a "significant" impairment. The clear statutory 
intent from the term "significant" is that there be, in the least, some 
degree of permanent impairment. This degree, when reflected as 0% in 
an impairment rating, falls below this standard.10 
9
 In evaluating medical causation, the independent medical panel 
determined that there was "no residual from the industrial accident", thus 
finding no impairment. See R. at 391. This is at odds with the 
Commission's determination. 
10
 Thurston Cable's interpretation of this statute is consistent with 
other states. For instance in State, ex. rel. Blankenship v. Richardson, 196 
W. Va. 726, 474 S.E.2d 906 (1996) the court held that a claimant must 
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By way of analogy, the Commission's own rules indicate that only 
"significant medical issues" will be forwarded to a medical panel. A 
significant medical issue includes "conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person". See Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2(A)(2). In other words, by the 
Commission's own rules, a variance of 5% or less is not considered 
"significant." Also important to note is that this rule does not use the 
term "physical impairment ratincf, although that is the obvious intent. 
Such is the case here. 
Based upon the foregoing, because Mr. DeMille has failed to meet 
the first prong of the test under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413, this Court 
should deny any award of permanent total disability benefits. 
€ The Commission's Findings Underlying Its Determination 
that any Impairment is "Significant" Are Inadequate 
The Commission's findings with regard to whether Mr. DeMilleys 
alleged impairment is "significant" are inadequate. The Commission's 
Order does not reference any underlying medical records so as to give 
Thurston Cable knowledge of the subsidiary facts giving rise to this 
have at least 50% medical impairment in order to qualify for an award of 
permanent total disability. 
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ultimate finding. As a result, this finding is certainly reversible or 
subject to remand. 
POINT 3: THE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
SEPTEMBER 14, 1995 INDUSTRIAL INJURY WAS THE 
"DIRECT CAUSE" OF MR. DEMILLE'S PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY 
The Commission's determination that the industrial accident of 
September 1995 was a "direct cause" of the claimant's permanent total 
disability status is equally incorrect. Section 34A-2-413, U.C.A. provides 
that a claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
evidence that "the industrial accident . . . was the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(b)(iii) (emphasis added). 
Utah's appellate courts and Labor Commission have not explicitly 
defined direct cause in the workers compensation context. However, 
Utah's appellate courts in other cases have stated that "direct cause" is 
generally synonymous with the terms "primary cause", "real cause", 
"prepondering cause" and even "proximate cause"11. See, e.g. Boyd v. 
11
 While earlier Utah Supreme Court cases have stated that "proximate 
causation" is applicable in the worker's compensation context, see Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 231 P. 442 (Utah 1924), later worker's 
compensation cases held to the contrary. See Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 
758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, it is evident that these cases 
were not addressing the same statutory requirement of "direct causation" 
listed here. 
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San Pedro. L. A. & S. L. R.R.. 45 Utah 449, 452 (1915) ("proximate 
cause"); Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Utah 220, 
225-26 (1929) ("proximate cause"); Rogers v. Rio Grande W. R.R., 32 
Utah 367, 376 (1907) ("real cause"); Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 102 
Utah 563, 573 (1943) ("prepondering cause"); Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 415, 420 (1924) ("proximate cause"); 
Anderson v. Nielson, 43 Utah 564, 574 (1913) ("probable" or "proximate 
cause"). 
Thurston Cable has also reviewed medical and legal literature for a 
definition of "direct cause" to limited avail. One court has explicitly 
defined "direct cause" as "a cause which had a substantial part in 
bringing about the harm which was either the dire t tesult or a 
reasonable probable consequence of the act." Jenson v. Eveleth 
Taconite Company. 199 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17978 (D. Minn. 1996). The 
Findlaw.com LawCrawler legal dictionary defines "direct cause" as the 
"proximate cause." Proximate cause is defined in that publication as "a 
cause that sets in motion a sequences of events uninterrupted by 
superceding causes and that results in an unusually foreseeable effect 
(as an injury) which would not otherwise have occurred." IcL 
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"Proximate causation" is defined similarly under Utah law as 
follows: 
Proximate cause is generally defined as '"that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause--
the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury.'" 
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 893 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see 
Aetna, 64 Utah at 420. 
The International Dictionary of Medical Biology also provides 
helpful insight. It distinguishes between an "immediate cause" and 
"proximate cause". Under that publication, proximate cause is defined as 
"the cause which, in the absence of other efficient intervening causes, is 
directly responsible for producing an effect and without which the effect 
would not have occurred/' International Dictionary of Medical Biology, 
Vol. 1 page 479 (John Wiley & Sons Ed.) (emphasis added). By contrast, 
"immediate cause" is defined as "in a succession of cases leading to a 
result, the final cause, which in and of itself and without additional 
intervening causes, directly produces the given result, as in death due to 
peritonitis arising as a complication of a gunshot wound to the abdomen. 
Peritonitis is the immediate cause of death, and the gunshot wound is 
the proximate cause." See id. at 479. 
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Using the definition noted in Jenson and the International 
Dictionary, the record is replete with documentation that the September 
1995 event was certainly not the "direct cause" of the claimant's 
permanent total disability. Like the gunshot wound example, the 
claimant's pre-existing low back condition, which resulted in a 
substantial impairment of 17%, was the event that brought about the 
petitioner's permanent total disability. Although the Industrial Injury 
could be considered the last immediate cause that lead to his permanent 
total disability, the fact remains that the primary or substantial cause of 
his permanent total disability is his pre-existing medical condition which 
resulted in surgery and a very large functional and anatomical loss. 
Consistent with its marshaling duty, Thurston Cable notes that the 
following facts support the Commission's Order on this finding: 
(1) Mr. DeMille was able to work before the Industrial Accident, 
but after the accident he was only able to work for short 
periods of time and never successfully held down any job 
more than ten months. See R., 233, @15-16, 30-33; R., 58. 
(2) The Commission notes that the medical evidence supports 
that Mr. DeMille was unable to work as a result of the 
industrial accident; however, the Commission fails to 
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reference any of the "medical evidence" in its opinion. See R., 
at 223. This omission is certainly a deficient finding. Given 
that the Commission's "finding" on this point is so inadequate 
that it cannot be meaningfully challenged as a factual 
determination, no marshaling is required on this point. See 
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The evidence noted above is clearly inadequate to sustain the 
Commission's findings. Indeed, the following evidence supports the 
finding that the September 14, 1995 accident was NOT the direct cause 
of the claimant's permanent total disability: 
(1) Dr. David Debenham noted in his report of February 5, 1996 
that the claimant has a long history of back problems dating to 
approximately 1987 or so when he herniated a disc while 
working for another employer which required a fusion at L4-5 
on May 13, 1986. See R. 229 at 191. 
(2) Dr. Jerold L. Hagen noted on August 14, 1998 that the 
claimant's first back injury was in 1984 at which time he had 
a decompressive laminectomy as well as a fusionand 
hardware. See R. 229 at 201. 
(3) In its report of March 10, 1996 a medical panel stated: 
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"CAUSATION: The Panel doubts there is any 
underlying physical problem other than the pain 
disorder that Mr. DeMille shows. The Panel felt 
that the pain disorder was not related to the 
industrial incident but was characterlogical and 
related to events that pre-existed the industrial 
accident We were unable to see any residual from 
the industrial accident. 
. . . The Panel does not assign any additional 
impairment to that which he received already for the 
original low back injury. 
See R. 229 at 391-92. 
(4) On March 13, 1996, Dr. Gerald Moress stated that the 
claimant's pain disorder was not causally related to the 
September 1995 injury. See R. 229 at 393. 
(5) In its second report of October 26, 1999 a medical panel 
stated: 
The panel feels now the same as the original panel 
felt in 1996. . . . What is permanent partial 
impairment related to direct and natural result of 
conditions preexisting September 14, 1995, 
including the 1985 accident? . . . 13%. . . 
.Permanentpartial impairment related to the 
incident of September 14, 1995. 0%. 
See R. 229 at 402. 
(6) Judge Sumpsion's order of August 7, 1987 in the case of Kirk 
DeMille v. Granger-Hunter Improvement District. Labor 
Comm'n Case No. 86000508 (1987), reveals that the claimant 
had a 17% whole person impairment for his low back prior to 
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the Industrial Injury. Of this, the judge found that 12.75% 
pre-dated the March 7, 1986 industrial event; 4.25% was 
related to the March 7 1986 industrial event. See R. at 1-15. 
(7) Mr. DeMille reported that he did not work following the May 
13, 1986 low back surgery until October 1990, a period of 
more than four years. This time off work is certainly very 
significant. See R. at 233, @30, 97. 
(8) Following the September 1995 Industrial Injury, Mr. DeMille 
began working for Danny Bundy Excavation from November 
1996 until August 1997 where he worked as a truck driver 
and heavy equipment operator. Mr. DeMille also worked at 
Hurst Stores from July 1998 until October 1998. See R. at 
97-98. 
It is the injured worker's burden to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the Industrial Injury was the "direct cause" of his 
permanent total disability; it is not the employer's burden to show 
otherwise. Mr. DeMille has failed in meeting his burden of proof. He did 
not submit any medical evidence showing that the Industrial Injury 
directly caused his permanent total disability. This omission is likely due 
to the fact that there is no medical documentation which states that the 
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claimant's permanent total disability stems directly from the September 
1995 industrial event. The Commission's Order is also deplete of any 
such reference to medical reports and, therefore, borders on legal 
insufficiency. See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The Commission merely states that Mr. DeMille was able to work 
prior to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident was left unable 
to work. With all due respect to the Commission, this is not the correct 
standard to use in assessing the "direct cause" of the claimant's 
permanent total disability. Without supporting medical evidence, and 
citation to it, the Commission's Order is legally insufficient. 
Also noteworthy is the ALJ and Commission's application of a "but 
for" analysis in their "direct cause" evaluation. In the ALJ's Order, he 
stated: "The 1997 Labor Commission Medical panel determined that but 
for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he likely would 
have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite 
period." Based upon this language, the ALJ ruled that the Industrial 
Injury was the "direct cause" of his permanent total disability. The 
Commission agreed. R. at 175, 223. Respondents submit that this 
analysis is incorrect. In Intermountain Health Care v. Bd. Rev, of the 
Ind. Comm'n. 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Court stated that it 
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did not believe that the correct standard for determining employer 
liability for subsequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury 
essentially amounts to a "but for" analysis. See id. Since the Court 
incorrectly employed this an analysis, rather than a correct direct 
causation analysis, based upon medical evidence, the Commission's 
Order is also deficient for this reason and must be reversed. 
POINT 4: THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE 
MEDICAL CAUSE OF MR. DEMILLE'S LOW BACK 
AND LEG CONDITION. 
It is well-settled that a claimant seeking permanent total disability 
benefits must prove not only the statutory requirements under the 
permanent total disability statute (in this case they are set forth in 
section 34A-2-413), but also that he sustained an injury by accident, 
medical causation, and legal causation. See Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Under Allen and its progeny, medical 
causation is derived from statutorily language which provides accident 
must "arise out of and in the course of employment." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-401. Medical causation demands that claimant prove his 
disability is medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred 
during a work-related activity. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. 
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In its order, the Commission referenced McKesson v. Lieberman, 
2002 UT App 10, 41 P.3d 468, and stated that the principles articulated 
in that case, namely, the "direct and natural consequences rule", do not 
apply in this instance since that rule only applies to industrial accidents 
followed by a non-industrial aggravation. Although the court wrongfully 
applied McKesson in the context of a direct causation evaluation, we 
submit that McKesson applies in this case for purposes of evaluating 
medical causation, and submit that the "direct and natural 
consequences rule" applies in this instance. That is, it applies when a 
compensable industrial accident is followed by an industrial aggravation. 
The Court in McKesson stated as follows: 
If 13 When an individual experiences a subsequent 
aggravation to an injury that arose out of and in the course of 
employment, the question of additional compensation will 
hinge on whether the subsequent injury is a natural result of 
the accident underlying the compensable primary injury. . . . 
f 17 When a claimant suffers a subsequent aggravation to a 
compensable workplace injury, the question of whether the 
subsequent injury is compensable turns upon the standard 
articulated in Intermountain. See Intermountain,839 P.2d at 
845. 
f 18 To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a 
subsequent aggravation to a compensable workplace injury, a 
claimant need only prove that his 'subsequent injury • . . [is] 
a natural result of his compensable primary injury.' 
Furthermore, a claimant need not show that his original 
tragedy was the sole cause of his subsequent injury. 
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Indeed, if the claimant can show that "the initial workplace 
injury [is merely] a 'contributing cause9 of the subsequent 
injury/' the claimant has met his burden. . . . 
f 21 [WJhether or not a claimant suffers from a preexisting 
condition, once benefits are properly awarded, the employer 
is responsible for "all medical costs resulting from the 
compensable injury/' including costs resulting from 
subsequent aggravations to the compensable workplace 
injury. 
Tf22 We conclude that it would be inappropriate to examine 
subsequent aggravations of compensable work-related 
injuries by applying the same exacting standard that we apply 
when determining compensability of primary workplace 
injuries involving pre-existing conditions. 
McKesson, 2002 UT App at f f 13, 17, 18, 21-22.12 
The principles articulated in McKesson are derived from Larsons on 
Workers' Compensation which provides: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an 
aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, 
is compensable if it is the direct and natural consequence of a 
compensable primary injury. . . . No intervening cause can 
break the chain of causation unless it is the sole cause of the 
second injury, that is, unless the original injury contributes 
nothing whatsoever to the final result. 
Larsons Desk Edition at 10.01, 10.04. 
There is no indication in Professor Larson's treatise that this rule 
was intended to apply only to compensable industrial injuries followed by 
12
 "Contribute" is defined as to "help" or to "assist". See Merriam 
Webster Dictionary at 176. 
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non-industrial aggravations. This is perhaps because applying such 
differing standards between subsequent industrial and non-industrial 
aggravations constitutes an Equal Protection Clause violation. Indeed, 
treating two classes of persons differently is certainly what the equal 
protection clause encompasses. Given that there is no "rational basis" 
for this distinction, the Commission in this case violated Thurston's 
Equal Protection rights by treating it differently as an employer versus a 
non-employer. See United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
(no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws'1); Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89. 
Contrary to the Commissions' conclusion, the fact that this is a 
case which involved a workplace injury followed by an industrial accident 
is irrelevant for purposes of the medical causation analysis underlying 
the direct and natural consequences rule. In paragraph 22 of the 
McKesson ruling, the Court was referring to the differing legal causation 
standard in industrial vs. non-industrial aggravations, not whether the 
medical causation standard of direct and natural consequences should 
differ depending solely on whether the second accident occurs on-the-job 
or not. 
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Application of the direct and natural consequences rule in this case 
reveals that Mr. DeMille has not sustained his burden of proving medical 
causation. It is undisputed that the claimant has a pre-existing low back 
condition which contributed to the subsequent Industrial Injury. The 
ALJ and Commission correctly recognized that the claimant injured his 
low back in a prior industrial accident on March 7, 1986 while working 
at Granger-Hunter and was awarded workers compensation benefits by 
the Utah Labor Commission. See Kirk DeMille v. Granger-Hunter 
Improvement District, L.C. Case No. 86000508 (1987). The medical 
records and the Commission's Order reveal that the initial 1986 
workplace injury caused a significant low back condition which resulted 
in a 17% impairment rating.13 Doctors, as well as the ALJ and 
Commission, have repeatedly noted that Mr. DeMille "aggravated" or 
"exacerbated" this pre-existing low back condition on September 14, 
1995. Based upon this evidence, there is certainly some connection 
between his subsequent Industrial Injury and the original industrial 
event at Granger-Hunter, triggering the "direct and natural 
consequences" rule. See McKesson. 2002 UT App at % 26. 
13
 In that case, the court found the claimant had a 17% whole person 
impairment relating to his low back. Of this 17%, Judge Sumpsion ruled 
that 4.25% related to the 1986 industrial injury; the rest was preexisting. 
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Given the applicability of the direct and natural consequences rule, 
liability rests not on Thurston Cable, but rather on the employer/carrier 
of the initial 1986 workplace injury -- that is, Granger-Hunter. Mr. 
DeMille had the duty to ask the ALJ to join Granger-Hunter and its 
carrier or file a new application under the Commission's continuing 
jurisdiction. See Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel. 965 P.2d 583 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420. However, under no 
circumstances is Thurston Cable responsible for any workers' 
compensation benefits given that Mr. DeMille's low back condition is the 
direct and natural result of his initial industrial injury with Granger-
Hunter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Thurston Cable asks the Commission 
to reverse the Commission's Order. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 t h day of March, 2004. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Hdnry K. Chai II 
Mark D. Dean 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Order Denying Motions for Review and Order of Remand dated May 
30, 20003, attached as Exhibit " 1 . " 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated November 6, 
2002, attached at Exhibit "2." 
Crafts v. Yellow Freight Systems. Labor Comm'n 99-0291 & 99-0292 
(7/30/03), attached at Exhibit "3." 
W.C. v. Magnesium Corp. dba Renco, Labor Comm'n 97-0583 
(5/21/02), attached at Exhibit "4." 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
ORDER OF REMAND 
Case No. 00-1059 
All parties ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision regarding Kirk S. Demille's claim for permanent total disability compensation benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
On September 14,1995, Mr. DeMille was injured in an accident while working for Thurston 
Cable. He now seeks permanent total disability compensation from Thurston Cable and its workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, Freemont Comp. (referred to jointly as "Thurston" hereafter). After 
an evidentiary hearing, Judge La Jeunesse concluded Mr. DeMille was entitled to a preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability, subject to further proceedings to determine whether he can be 
reemployed or rehabilitated. Judge LaJeunesse ordered Thurston to begin paying subsistence 
benefits to Mr. DeMille as of November 6, 2002, the date of Judge La Jeunesse's decision. 
Thurston requests Commission review of Judge LaJeunesse's decision on the grounds that: 
1) Mr. DeMille did not sustain a "significant impairment" from his accident at Thurston; and, 2) the 
accident was not the direct cause of his permanent total disability. For his part, Mr. DeMille asks 
the Commission to review the date on which subsistence benefits should commence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in Judge La Jeunesse's decision. As 
material to the issues raised by the parties' motions for review, the facts are summarized below. 
At the time Mr. DeMille began working for Thurston, he had a 17% whole person 
impairment from prior back injuries. Nevertheless, he was able to perform his work duties at 
KIRK S. DEMILLE, * 
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Thurston and remain gainfully employed. Then, on September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille fell off a 
front-end loader at Thurston. This accident significantly aggravated his preexisting back problems. 
He underwent back surgeries to treat his injuries, but developed a serious infection as a complication 
of the surgeries. The infection required even more medical care and, eventually, more surgery. All 
told, Mr. DeMille spent ten months in the hospital and had a total of six surgeries. As a result of 
all this, Mr. DeMille now has scarring in his spine, muscle and soft tissue of his back. Mr. DeMille 
is unable to sit, stand, or walk for more than a few minutes at a time. He cannot work or engage in 
any significant physical activity. His condition will not improve and will probably deteriorate. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
There is no question that Mr. DeMille injured his back in a work-related accident at Thurston 
on September 14, 1995. Consequently, his injuries are compensable under the Utah workers' 
compensation system. See §34A-2-401 of the Act. However, in order to receive the specific benefit 
of permanent total disability compensation, Mr. DeMille must satisfy the conditions set forth in 
§34A-2-413 of the Act. Thurston argues that Mr. DeMille has failed to meet two of those 
conditions. 
First, Thurston contends that Mr. DeMille has not met §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)'s requirement 
of a "significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident. 
. . that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement^)" Section 34A-2-102(8) defines 
"impairment" as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or function abnormality or 
loss." Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston on September 14, 1995, and the medical treatment he 
received as a result of the accident, produced scarring in muscle, spine and soft tissue, resulting in 
both anatomical and functional abnormality and loss. Thus, the record establishes that Mr. DeMille 
sustained an "impairment" within the meaning of the Act as a result of his accident at Thurston. 
The Commission notes Thurston's argument that Mr. DeMille's impairment cannot be 
considered significant because it has never been rated by a physician. While such a rating would 
have been helpful in this case, and might be essential in other cases, §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) only 
requires a "significant impairment," not a "significant impairment rating." In light of the facts and 
medical opinion submitted in this case, the Commission agrees with Judge LaJeunesse that Mr. 
DeMille has established a significant impairment. 
Thurston's second argument is that Mr. DeMille failed to meet §34A-2-413(1 )(b)(iii)'s 
requirement that "the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability." In considering this argument, the Commission notes Mr. DeMille was able to work prior 
to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident the resulting injuries and consequences of medical 
treatment left him unable to work, except for relatively short and unsuccessful efforts to rejoin the 
workforce. Mr. DeMille's inability to work as a result of the Thurston accident is confirmed by the 
medical evidence. Thus, Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston is the direct cause of his permanent 
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total disability. 
Although Thurston cites the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision in McKesson v. 
Lieberman, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002) to support its argument, McKesson involved a non-work 
aggravation of a work-related injury. The Court of Appeals' analysis of that situation is not 
applicable to a case such as this, where there have been two separate work accidents, the last of 
which removes the worker from the workforce. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. DeMille has satisfied the 
requirements of §34A-2-413(l)(b), including subparts (i) and (iii). He is therefore entitled to a 
tentative determination of permanent total disability. 
The Commission now turns to Mr. DeMille's contention that he should receive retroactive 
subsistence benefits. As pointed out by Thurston, the Commission has addressed this issue before. 
The Commission has consistently held that, because the Act itself does not specify when the 
subsistence payments should begin, that question must be decided on a case by case basis by the 
ALJ, subject to review by the Commission or Appeals Board. In this case, the Commission finds 
no basis to disturb Judge LaJeunesse's order that Thurston begin payment of subsistence benefits 
to Mr. DeMille as of November 6, 2002. 
Finally, Mr. DeMille contends that Judge LaJeunesse neglected to provide for payment of 
attorneys fees to Mr. DeMille's counsel. Because the Commission remands this matter to Judge 
LaJeunesse for additional proceedings, the Commission instructs Judge LaJeunesse to consider and 
rule upon this question of attorneys fees. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge LaJeunesse's decision in this matter and denies the motions 
for review of Thurston and Mr.DeMille. The Commission remands this matter to Judge LaJeunesse 
to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation and 
also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. DeMille's counsel. It is so ordered. 
Dated this jffiday of May, 2003 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
HEARING: Old Historic Courtroom 97 East St. George Blvd. St. George, Utah, on 
May 13, 2002, at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, was present and represented by his attorney 
Virginius Dabney. 
The respondents were represented by attorney Henry K. Chai II. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, filed an "Application For Hearing" with the Utah Labor 
Commission on June 5, 2001, and claimed entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation. Mr. DeMille's claim for workers' compensation benefits derived from a low back 
injury he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995. 
The respondents claimed that the September 14, 1995 industrial injury did not cause Mr. DeMille 
to become permanently and totally disabled. The respondents argued that Mr. DeMille suffered 
no permanent impairment as a result of the September 14, 1995 industrial accident beyond that 
already endured by Mr. DeMille prior to the September 14, 1995 event. 
II. ISSUE. 
Did the September 14 1995 industrial accident cause Kirk DeMille to become permanently and 
totally disabled? 
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III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation derived from a low back injury 
he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995. Mr. DeMille had significant low 
back problems prior to September 15, 1995. 
On August 7, 1987 Judge Richard Sumsion entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in Case No. 86000508 Kirk DeMille v. Granger-Hunter Improvement District (hereinafter 
the 1987 Order). Case No. 86000508 involved a low back injury Mr. DeMille suffered when he 
attempted to open a fire hydrant valve with an oversized pipe wrench while employed with the 
Granger-Hunter Improvement District on March 7, 1986. 
In his 1987 Order Judge Sumsion held that Mr. DeMille sustained a 12.75% whole person 
impairment as a result of low back problems that preexisted the March 7, 1986 industrial 
accident. Judge Sumsion further found that Mr. DeMille sustained a 4.25% whole person 
impairment from the March 7, 1986 low back injury. In sum, as of March 7, 1986 Mr. DeMille 
endured a 17% whole person impairment consequent to low back problems.1 
On August 8, 1997 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in Case No. 96920 Kirk DeMille v. Thurston Cable Construction et al (hereinafter the 
1997 Order). Case No. 96920 involved the same industrial accident and injury as the present 
case. Judge Sims found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left 
leg when he fell off a front-end loader. Judge Sims determined that Mr. DeMille's September 
14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Thurston Cable 
Construction (Thurston).2 
On November 9, 2000 Mr. D.eMille filed an action principally concerned with his claim for 
additional temporary total disability compensation. On March 16, 2001 I denied a belated 
motion by Mr. DeMille to amend his claim for the inclusion of permanent total disability. On 
June 5, 2001, Mr. DeMille filed the present Application for Hearing on the issue of permanent 
total disability 
1
 See also: November 10, 1987 Order Granting Motion for Review (this order only dealt 
with the issue concerning the medical necessity of surgery and in all other respects affirmed 
Judge Sumsion's 1987 Order). See also: January 19, 1989 Order for Reimbursement from the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
2
 The Employers' First Report of Injury noted that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille 
fell six feet from a Michigan Loader and landed on his left leg and back. 
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On January 2, 2002 I entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order with respect to 
Mr. DeMille's claim for additional temporary total disability compensation related to the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident with Thurston, [the January 2, 2002 Order]. In the 
January 2, 2002 Order I held that Both Mr. DeMille's treating physicians, Dr. Home and Dr. 
Hagen, opined that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope for improvement. The 
opinions of Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen categorized Mr. DeMille as permanently totally disabled 
which, as a matter of law precluded an award of ongoing temporary total disability benefits. 
At the hearing on May 13, 2002 I accepted into evidence Exhibit's "P-l," "P-2," and Volume 3 
of the Medical Exhibit accepted in the prior proceeding as Exhibit M-l."3 On August 22, 2002, 
some three months after the close of evidence in this case, Mr. DeMille, through his attorney Mr. 
Dabney, attempted to submit some additional medical records into evidence. The respondents 
objected to the submission of the additional medical records. I hereby disallow the submission of 
the additional medical records filed by Mr. DeMille August 22, 2002 and give them no further 
consideration. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Prior Orders. 
To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt the findings set 
forth in the 1997 Order and the January 2, 2002 Order. 
B. Employment. 
The 1997 Order established that Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995. 
C. Compensation Rate. 
The 1997 Order found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three 
dependent children. The 1997 Order established that on September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's 
compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40 hours per week, for an average weekly 
wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages determined by the 1997 Order confirmed 
$335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for the 
September 14, 1995 injury. 
3At the hearing on April 3, 2001 the parties agreed to remove pages 53-58 from Volume I 
of Exhibit "J-l." At the hearing on May 13, 2002 I sustained objections to the admissibility of 
Exhibit's "P-3M and "P-4" into evidence. 
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D. Prior Low Back Injuries. 
As discussed infra, Mr. DeMiile suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries 
prior to the September 14, 1995 industrial accident. 
E. The September 14, 1995 Industrial Injury. 
The 1997 Order found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMiile injured his low back and left leg 
when he fell off a front-end loader. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injury arose out of and in 
the course of his employment with Thurston. For the sake of clarity, I repeat some of the facts 
set forth in January 2, 2002 Order. 
On September 21, 1995 Dr. Jonathan Home M.D. diagnosed Mr. DeMiile with: 
1. Radiculopathy left leg L5 nerve root. 
2. Solid fusion L4-L5 vertebra with retained internal hardware two AD 
screws and cerclage wire.4 
3. New strain/sprain contusion lumbosacral spine possible disc herniation. 
[Exhibit " J - r Vol. n p. 294]. 
On September 28, 1995 a Lumbar Myelogram and Post Myelogram CT performed by Dr. Steven 
Davis M.D. disclosed: 
The post myleogram CT images demonstrate again the post operative changes 
with solid appearing bone graft material posterolateral extending from L4 through 
S1. There is a very small central herniated nucleus pulposus at L5-S1 which 
indents the thecal sac but does not compress adjacent nerve roots. The remaining 
levels are unremarkable, [id. at 82]. 
On October 4, 1995 Dr. Home observed that: 
The myelogram and CT scan did not help us very much, it didn't show anything 
new. [id. at 297]. 
4
 Mr. DeMille's fusion occurred prior to his September 14, 1995 industrial accident 
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On October 17, 1995 Dr. Home removed the hardware from Mr. DeMille's prior lumbar fusion 
which involved: 
1. Exploration of lumbar spine fusion of L4-L5. 
2. Removal of two screws, two washers, HO type, and removal of cerclage 
wire. 
3. Saucerization of metallurgical osteitis, [id. at Vol. III]. 
On January 19, 1996 Dr. John Davis took flexion and extension view x-rays of Mr. DeMille's 
lumbar spine which revealed: 
Post surgical changes lower lumbar spine. Associated degenerative changes lower 
lumbar spine. Facet joint narrowing L3-4 and L5-S1 is moderate. Severe 
narrowing L4-5 Facet may be post surgical in nature, [id. Vol. I at 83]. 
The respondents assembled a medical panel composed of Dr. Gerald Moress M.D., neurologist, 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook M.D., orthopedic surgeon and, Dr. Robert Burgoyne M.D., a psychiatrist. 
On March 10, 1996 the respondents' medical panel concluded: 
The panel doubts that there is any underlying physical problem other than the pain 
disorder that Mr. DeMille shows. The panel felt the pain disorder was not related 
to the industrial incident5 but was characterological and related to events that pre-
existed the industrial incident. We were unable to see any residual from the 
industrial incident, [id. Vol. II at 391]. 
On November 13, 1996 Dr. Home noted: 
An electromyogram and EMG was performed which showed positive 
radiculopathy, which is 100% evidence of continued problems with the nerve root 
components for the left sciatic nerve, which have been part of the patient's 
problem all along, [id. Vol. II at 313]. 
The September 14, 1995 industrial accident. 
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Judge Sims appointed a medical panel that consisted of Dr. Madison Thomas M.D., neurologist 
and, Dr. Glen Momberger M.D., orthopedic surgeon. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission 
medical panel concluded: 
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would 
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant 
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively 
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a 
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to 
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol. 
II at 440]. 
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the report of the medical panel and found that on 
September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille in fact injured his low back and left leg when he fell off the 
front-end loader. 
On April 28, 1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal 
epidural dorsal column stimulator." [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr. 
DeMille endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol. I. 
at 12, 24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204, 206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home 
removed the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that: 
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY6 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE, 
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT 
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND 
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. H 
at 332]. 
The respondents assembled a second medical panel composed of neurologists Dr. Moress and Dr. 
Scott Knorp. [id. Vol. II at 400]. On October 26, 1999 the respondents' second medical panel 
essentially corroborated the conclusions reached by the respondent's first medical panel, [id. at 
400-402]' 
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home concluded: 
He has continued severe low back and left leg pain with radiculopathy 
arachnoiditis, perispinal scarring from infection, soft tissue scarring in muscles 
and supporting tissues of the back. [id. Vol. II at 359]. 
6
 Respondent Freemont Comp. 
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Judge Sims' 1997 Order conclusively confirmed that the 1995 industrial accident caused Mr. 
DeMille some serious back and left leg problems contrary to the opinions rendered by the 
respondents' medical panels. In the January' 2, 2002 Order I found that: 
[t]he preponderance of the medical evidence established that Mr. DeMille 
suffered ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy in part due to 
permanent aggravations caused by the 1995 accident. The undisputed medical 
evidence in this case verified that Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal soft 
tissue damage from infections accompanying the stimulator implant. No dispute 
existed that Freemont Comp's requirement of.a two stage procedure for the 
stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the 
stimulator. 
F. Permanent Total Disability. 
1. Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14,1995 Industrial 
Accident. 
The respondents correctly observed that Mr. DeMille suffered from a 17% whole person 
impairment due to low back problems that pre-dated the September 14, 1995 industrial accident 
in the present case. The respondents then noted that Mr. DeMille received no additional 
impairment rating for the additional injuries caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial 
accident. Because nobody assigned a percentage of impairment to Mr. DeMille's injuries caused 
by the September 14, 1995 industrial accident, the respondents argued he did not suffer a 
significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995). 
The respondents overlooked several important conclusions contained in the determinative 
medical evidence in this case. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission Medical Panel 
concluded: 
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would 
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant 
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively 
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a 
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to 
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol. 
II at 440]. 
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the findings of the Medical Panel which became the 
controlling medical evidence in this case. I in turn adopted Judge Sims findings in my January 2, 
2002 Order. 
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My January 2, 2002 Order also recounted the respondents responsibility for the infections and six 
surgical procedures endured by Mr. DeMille related to his dorsal column stimulator. On April 
28, 1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal epidural 
dorsal column stimulator/' [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr. DeMille 
endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol. I. at 12, 
24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204, 206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home removed 
the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that: 
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY7 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE, 
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT 
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND 
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. II 
at 332]. 
Following the infections associated with the spinal cord stimulator, his treating physicians 
rendered a series of opinions concerning Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability caused by the 
September 14, 1995 industrial injury. On June 21, 1999 Dr. Home stated: 
My opinion is he may very likely be as good as he's going to get. 
********** 
He's certainly disabled and can do very little if anything. He can hardly sit in a 
car for a few minutes, can't sit up around the house for longer than Vi hour or an 
hour without laying back down. He's not capable of any type of gainful 
employment and I see no light at the end of the tunnel that's going to change this. 
[id. Vol. II at 346i][emphasis added]. 
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home stated: 
S.S. has determined that he is totally disabled with which I agree. There is no way 
that he could sit/walk/be driven to a job or functionally be able to perform even a 
sedentary job for a predictable time of even forty hours. Any of this would 
aggravate his condition, [id. Vol. II at 359-360]. 
7
 Respondent Freemont Comp. 
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On March 29, 2001 Dr. Home opined thatj 
The patient absolutely is not going to improve. He may become and probably will 
become progressively more severe, [id. Vol. II at 360B]. 
********** 
He is totally disabled, is unable to sit, stand, walk for more than just a few 
minutes at a time, and has significantly increases of pain in performing those 
small intervals of activity. He uses a cane even to move around the home...At the 
very most, he's able to walk with a cane 2-3 blocks in extreme circumstances...In 
extreme circumstances, he can stand for 20-30 minutes, or sit for 45 to 90 minutes 
such as on some car rides or even going to a doctor's office, [id. Vol. II at 
360C][emphasis added] 
On April 24, 2001 Dr. Jerold Hagen M.D. opined regarding Mr. DeMille: 
He has been unable to work or engage in any activity. He cannot sit for any length 
of time nor can he walk for any distance. 
*********** 
[M]r. DeMille is a patient who's life has been totally changed since 1998 and has 
been unable to work or perform any meaningful activity....It is doubtful to me that 
the patient will ever be able to hold down a meaningful job unless some resolution 
can be found for his incessant pain. [id. Vol. Ill at 456] [emphasis added]. 
Both Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen professed that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope 
for improvement. The controlling findings of the June 19, 1997 Labor Commission Medical 
Panel determined that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a 
"significant injury," and "produced a significant aggravation" of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low 
back problems, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The Labor Commission Medical Panel also concluded that 
but for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he "likely (would) have continued 
relatively asymptomatic for an indefinite period." [id.]. 
Dr. Home maintained that decisions made by respondents concerning Mr. DeMille's dorsal 
column stimulator resulted in his ten month course of hospitalizations, six surgical interventions, 
and much of the current problems suffered by Mr. DeMille. [id. Vol. II at 332]. Dr. Hagen 
opined that inter alia the resultant complications caused by the infections from dorsal column 
stimulator eventually led to Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability. 
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In summary, the established facts in this case revealed that between 1987, and September 14, 
1995, Mr. DeMille remained relatively asymptomatic and able to work. The determinative facts 
of this case confirmed that but for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he 
likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period. 
The established facts of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial 
accident itself constituted a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. 
DeMille's preexisting low back problems. Further, the conclusive evidence in this case disclosed 
that the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in serious, permanent 
exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems. While not given a percentage impairment rating, 
Mr. DeMille's low back problems caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial accident took him 
from employability with a preexisting 17% whole person impairment to permanent total 
disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injuries caused a significant 
impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995). 
2. Permanent Total Disability. 
a. Gainful Employment. 
Sometime after the September 14, 1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille worked for three 
months as a sales clerk at Hurst Sporting Goods (Hurst). Mr. DeMille terminated his 
employment with Hurst because of back pain. 
After the September 14, 1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille also worked for six months with 
Danny Bundy Construction Company (Danny Bundy). Again, Mr. DeMille stopped working 
with Danny Bundy because of his back problems. Mr. DeMille held no gainful employment 
since his job with Danny Bundy. At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille 
remained unemployed. 
b. Ability to do Basic Work Activities. 
As set forth in Section F/.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
c. Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for 
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995. 
As set forth in Section IV.F. 1. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work 
activities. 
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cL Other Work Reasonably Available. 
As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
e. Conclusion. 
As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed Mr. 
DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr. 
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting 
injuries that left Mr. DexMille permanently and totally disabled. 
3. Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability. 
As cited multiple times herein, the opinion of the 1997 Labor Commission Medical Panel 
constituted the conclusive medical opinion as adopted by Judge Sims' 1997 Order and my own 
January 2, 2002 Order. The 1997 Labor Commission Medical panel determined that but for Mr. 
DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively 
asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The established facts 
of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted 
a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low 
back problems, [id.]. Further, the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care 
resulted in serious exacerbations of the problems caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial 
accident, [id. Vol. II at 332, and Vol. HI. at 456]. In sum, the determinative medical evidence in 
this case established that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the 
respondents medaling in his medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations 
to preexisting problems that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
4. Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. DeMille worked for nine months after his September 14, 1995 industrial accident, [see: 
Section IV.F.2.a.]. Thereafter, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed, and permanently, totally 
disabled. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case established the 
commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability at June 15, 1996. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Prior Orders. 
To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt the conclusions of 
law set forth in the 1997 Order, and the January 2, 2002 Order. 
B. Employment. 
Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995. 
C. Compensation Rate. 
On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three dependent children. Further, on 
September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40 
hours per week, for an average weekly wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages 
established $335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for 
the September 14, 1995 injury. 
D. Prior Low Back Injuries. 
Mr. DeMille suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries prior to the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident. 
E. The September 14,1995 Industrial Injury. 
On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left leg when he fell off a front-
end loader. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment with Thurston. 
The 1995 industrial accident caused Mr. DeMille serious back problems. Mr. DeMille suffered 
ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy due to permanent aggravations caused by the 
1995 accident. Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal, soft tissue damage from infections 
accompanying the stimulator implant. Freemont Comp's requirement of a two stage procedure 
for the stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the 
stimulator.8 
8
 As stated by professor Larson: "It is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary 
injury by medical or surgical treatment is compensable." A. LARSON and L. LARSON, LARSON'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 10.09 [1] (2002). See also: Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial 
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F. Permanent Total Disability. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1) (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or 
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
(i) The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease 
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) The employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of 
the employees permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude 
that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions 
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis of 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available taking 
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Comm'n. 73 Utah 535, 275 P. 777 (1929). 
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1. Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14, 1995 Industrial 
Accident 
Between 1987, and September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMiIle's preexisting low back problems remained 
relatively asymptomatic and he was able to work. But for Mr. DeMiIle's September 14, 1995 
industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for 
an indefinite period. Mr. DeMiIle's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a 
significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMiIle's preexisting low back 
problems. Further, the respondents'- interference in Mr. DeMiIle's medical care resulted in 
serious, permanent exacerbations to Mr. DeMiIle's back problems. 
While not given a percentage impairment rating, Mr. DeMiIle's low back problems caused by the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident took him from employability with a preexisting 17% 
whole person impairment to permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMiIle's September 14, 
1995 injuries caused a significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(l)(b)(i)(1995).9 
2. Permanent Total Disability. 
a. Gainful Employment 
At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed. 
b. Ability to do Basic Work Activities. 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
c. Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for 
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995, 
Mr. DeMiIle's September 14, 1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work 
activities. 
9
 Respondents' argument that a finding of "significant impairment" requires a rated 
impairment would lead to the unnecessary exercise of obtaining impairment ratings for all 
injuries causing permanent total disability regardless of the seriousness or nature of the injury. 
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d. Other Work Reasonably Available. 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
e. Conclusion. 
Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr. 
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting 
injuries that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
3. Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in his 
medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting injuries that 
left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
4. Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability. 
The commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability is June 15, 1996. 
VI. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or 
Freemont Comp. shall pay Kirk DeMille subsistence payments in the amount of S335.00 per 
week as of the date of this order and ongoing until further order of the Labor Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (6)(b) (1995). Further benefits to be determined after 
accomplishment of the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann §35-1-67 (6)(a). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or 
Freemont Comp. shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Kirk DeMille's back 
injuries incurred on September 14, 1995, according to the medical and surgical fee schedule of 
the Utah Labor Commission. The respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or Freemont 
Comp. shall also pay travel allowances plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the respondents intend to submit a reemployment plan, the 
respondents shall file notice of such intent within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. The 
respondents shall file the reemployment plan within thirty (30) days after filing the notice of 
intent to file the plan, or within (60) days of the date of this order. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by separate notice hearing shall be set with respect to any 
reemployment plan submitted by respondents. 
Dated this 6th day of November 2002, 
chard M. La Jeunesse 
dministrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 davs of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Karla Rush, certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage, except as noted below, a copy 
of the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Order in the case of DeMille v. Thurston 
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99-0291 M.R.C. v. Yellow Freight Issued: 7/30/03 
1. M. R. C. asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge George's 
denial of Mr. C claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. C. seeks permanent total disability compensation for back injuries sustained between April 
16 and June 24,1-997, while working for Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. After an evidentiary 
hearing, Judge George found that Mr. C 1997 injury temporarily aggravated his preexisting back 
problems, but did not cause any additional permanent impairment. Judge George therefore denied 
Mr. C claim for permanent total disability compensation. 
Mr. C. now seeks Commission review of Judge George's decision. Specifically, Mr. C. argues: 1) 
A compensation agreement signed by Mr. C. and Yellow Freight "is res judicata" as to the 
permanent impairment attributable to those injuries; 2) The 1997 injury was a new injury, rather 
than a temporary aggravation of a preexisting condition; and 3) The 1997 injury satisfies the 
statutory requirements of the Act for a tentative finding that Mr. C. is permanently and totally 
disabled. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in Judge George's decision. As material to 
the issues raised in Mr. Craft's motion for review, the facts can be summarized as follows. 
Prior to events of April/June 1997, Mr. C. worked as a long-haul truck driver for 30 years. In 
1972 and again in 1975, he underwent spinal surgery. In 1991, while working for Yellow Freight 
in Nevada, Mr. C. injured his back in a work-related accident. Yellow Freight and its insurance 
carrier at that time, the Nevada State Industrial Insurance System, accepted liability and paid Mr. 
C medical expenses and disability compensation. In 1994, Mr. C. returned to work for Yellow 
Freight in Colorado. Then, beginning in mid-April 1997, he was reassigned to work for Yellow 
Freight in Utah. 
Yellow Freight's Utah division used foam rubber mattresses in the sleeper cabs of its trucks. 
According to Mr. C, these mattresses provided inadequate protection from the bumps and 
vibrations of the truck. Mr. C. began to experience increased back pain and other problems. This 
culminated on June 23, 1997, when Mr. C. was resting in the sleeper of his truck while his co-
driver was driving. The truck hit a pot hole, severely jostling Mr. C. He felt immediate pain in 
his back and stomach, and numbness in his arms. The event was reported immediately to Yellow 
Freight. The company instructed Mr. C. to continue on to Salt Lake City, where he obtained 
medical attention. 
Dr. Anderson, Mr. C treating physician, initially restricted Mr. C. from driving or lifting more 
than 10 pounds. On September 22, 1997, Dr. Anderson later released Mr. C. to return to work, 
but with a permanent restriction against long-distance driving or heavy lifting. Yellow Freight 
then discharged Mr. C. because it was unable to provide work for him within his limitations. 
On about July 20, 1998, Mr. C. and Felicia Hildreth, an adjuster for Yellow Freight, submitted a 
signed Compensation Agreement to the Commission. The Compensation Agreement set forth the 
method of computation of Mr. C temporary total disability compensation and also stated that 
Mr. C. was entitled to permanent partial disability compensation for a 3% whole person 
impairment. The record now before the Commission establishes that the Compensation 
Agreement erred in attributing a 3% permanent impairment to Mr. C 1997 work injury. The 3% 
impairment was, in fact, attributable to Mr. C 1991 work injury. 
Mr. C. has submitted no medical evidence that his work-related injury of April/June 1997, 
caused any permanent impairment. To the contrary, the preponderance of medical evidence 
establishes that the events of April/June 1997 caused only a temporary aggravation of Mr. C. 
serious and substantial preexisting back problems. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Mr. C. is seeking permanent total disability compensation for his injuries of April/June 1997. To 
establish a prima facie case for permanent total disability compensation, an injured worker must 
first meet the threshold requirements set forth in §34A-2-401 of the Act by establishing that the 
worker was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. There appears to 
be no question that Mr. C. has met these threshold requirements. 
Having established that his injuries are generally compensable under the workers' compensation 
system, Mr. C. must also satisfy the specific provisions of §34A-2-413 of the Act, which governs 
claims for permanent total disability compensation. Section §34A-2-413 requires that Mr. C. 
satisfy each of the following criteria: a) he sustained a significant impairment from his work 
accident; b) he is permanently and totally disabled, as judged by the standards set forth in the 
statute; and c) his work accident directly caused his permanent total disability. 
As noted above, the first test Mr. C. must satisfy is that he is significantly impaired from his 
work accident. Mr. C. attempts to meet this requirement by reference to the Compensation 
Agreement prepared by the parties in July 1998. According to Mr. C, the Compensation 
Agreement "is res judicata" as to the agreement's contents and, therefore, conclusively establishes 
that Mr. C. suffered a 3% impairment from his April/July 1997 injury. 
The Commission does not agree with Mr. C theory regarding the effect of the Compensation 
Agreement. The Commission's long-standing use and practice of Compensation Agreements is 
merely to verify the parties' mathematical calculations of injured workers' benefits and record the 
amount of such benefits. This function is generally performed by the Commission's clerical staff. 
The Compensation Agreement also provides a means by which the Commission can determine 
and order payment of attorneys fees. Even with respect to these issues, the parties are free to 
reject the Compensation Agreement and litigate such matters before an ALJ. In summary, the 
Compensation Agreement is neither an adjudication nor a settlement and cannot be given res 
judicata effect. Consequently, the Compensation Agreement's reference to a 3% whole person 
impairment is no evidence that Mr. C. suffered any permanent impairment from the April/June 
1997 accident. 
Mr. C. contends that the facts and circumstances of his 1997 injury satisfies the statutory 
requirements of the Act for a tentative finding of permanent and total disability. The Commission 
does not agree. The first element necessary to a finding of permanent total disability requires Mr. 
C. to prove he was significantly impaired from the work accident. As already noted, the evidence 
does not establish that fact. Consequently, Mr. C. has failed to meet the initial requirement to any 
finding of permanent total disability and his claim must be denied. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge George's decision and denies Mr. C motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 30th day of July, 2003. 
R. Lee Ellertson, Commissioner 
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97-0583 W.C. v. Magnesium Corporation dba Renco Issued: 5/21/02 
Magnesium Corporation, d.b.a. Renco, and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, 
National Union Fire Insurance (referred to jointly as "Renco"), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah 
Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Sims' preliminary determination that W. 
C. is permanently and totally disabled for purposes of compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 35, Chapter 1, U.C.A., 1994 Supp.).1 Renco also asks the 
Appeals Board to review Administrative Law Judge Eblen's determination that Mr. C. cannot be 
reemployed or rehabilitated and is, therefore, entitled to a final award of permanent total disability 
compensation. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63^6b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. C. seeks permanent total disability compensation for a back injury caused by a work-
related accident at Renco on September 8, 1994. Judge Sims conducted the first evidentiary hearing 
on Mr. C.'s claim and, on May 11, 1998, issued an interim finding that Mr. C. was permanently and 
totally disabled, subject to further proceedings to determine if he could be reemployed or 
rehabilitated. 
Judge Sims then retired from the Commission. Judge Switzer conducted additional 
proceedings regarding Mr. C.'s claim, but Judge Switzer then left the Commission. Ultimately, 
responsibility for completing the adjudication of Mr C.'s case devolved to Judge Eblen. After 
further evidentiary proceedings, Judge Eblen concluded that Renco had failed to establish Mr. C. 
could be reemployed or rehabilitated. Consequently, Judge Eblen issued a final order on September 
28, 2001, awarding permanent total disability compensation to Mr. C . 
Renco now asks the Appeals Board to review Judge Sims' interim findings and Judge 
Eblen's final order. In its motion for review, Renco raises the following issues: 1) Whether Mr. 
C.'ss work at Renco was the 'legal cause" of the injuries for which he now seeks compensation; 2) 
Whether Mr. C. meets the standards of the Act for a preliminary determination of permanent total 
disability; 3) Whether the ALJ properly applied the "reemployment/rehabilitation" provisions found 
in §67 of the Act; and 4) The constitutionality of the Act's provisions governing permanent total 
disability compensation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board affirms and adopts the findings of fact set forth in Judge Sims and Judge 
Eblen's decisions to the extent such findings are not inconsistent with the Appeals Board's own 
findings, set forth below. 
Mr. C. was born in 1950. In grade school, he was diagnosed with dyslexia. He suffered from 
learning difficulties throughout his school career, finally leaving school during the 1 Ith grade with 
limited ability to read or write. Mr. C. then received training as a welder through vocational courses 
and in the military. On discharge from service, he found employment as a welder. Renco hired him 
in that capacity during 1984. 
While working at Renco on August 10, 1989, Mr. C. fell down some stairs and injured his 
back. He underwent decompressive laminectomy surgery and was left with a 23% whole person 
impairment from the work injury plus a 2% whole person impairment from preexisting facet joint 
hypertrophy and stenosis (narrowing) of the disc space. Mr. C. returned to Renco under light duty 
restrictions and continued to work there until a second accident on September 8, 1994. 
On the morning of September 8,1994, Mr. C. was part of a crew relining refractory cells with 
refractory brick. Mr. C.'s specific assignment was to cut each brick to the size required for 
installation. He performed this task by lifting individual bricks from a pallet, then carrying each 
brick several feet to a saw where he would then make the necessary cuts. Each of the refractory 
bricks weighed approximately 35 pounds. During the first three hours of his shift, Mr. C. lifted, 
carried and cut approximately 60 bricks and experienced some back pain. Then, as he lifted yet 
another brick, he felt a sharp, additional pain in his back. 
Mr. C. was diagnosed with recurrent disc herniation at the L4/5 level of his spine, coupled 
with the same facet joint hypertrophy and disc space stenosis that had been found to exist prior to 
his 1989 injury. He underwent another surgery. As a result of the 1994 accident and surgery, he has 
an additional 5% whole person impairment and now suffers from "failed back syndrome." It is the 
consensus of medical opinion that additional surgery would not alleviate Mr. C.'s continuing back 
problems. 
Mr. C. was able to perform his work duties at Renco prior to the accident of September 1994. 
He has not returned to work at Renco, or elsewhere, since that accident. On October 2, 1996, the 
Social Security Administration found Mr. C. totally disabled as of September 8, 1994, the date of 
his accident at Renco. 
Mr. C. continues to suffer from pain in his back and legs. He has difficulty with household 
chores and requires frequent rest periods and changes of position. He uses a cane. In addition to his 
work-related injuries, Mr. C. suffers from gout, high cholesterol, borderline diabetes and depression, 
as well as learning disabilities related to his dyslexia. 
During early April, 1995, Mr. C. underwent an extensive, week-long evaluation by the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation. Mr. C. was noted to have vocational strengths in areas such as 
abstract reasoning, mechanical aptitude, organizational skills, and "persistence despite discomforts 
and learning disabilities." Vocational weaknesses were noted in his ability to read and write, math 
skills, fine movement coordination and dexterity, and work tolerance in light of continuing pain. The 
evaluator concluded that Mr. C.'s various disabilities limited him to sedentary or light duty work on 
a part-time basis. The evaluator further concluded that Mr. C.'s various problems made it unlikely 
that he could "make a liveable income from employment." 
Renco subsequently employed Buck Hall, a certified vocational counselor with Crawford and 
Company Disability Management Company, to provide an additional assessment of Mr. C.'s 
employability. Mr. Hall submitted his report on January 23, 1998. Relying on opinions of a 
physician and physical therapist who had also examined Mr. C. on behalf of Renco, Mr. Hall 
concluded Mr. C. could work at a "light medium" level of exertion. Mr. Hall noted that Mr. C. had 
an excellent employment history prior to his work accident of September, 1994. Mr. Hall also noted 
many of the same vocational strengths that had been reported by the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation. However, Mr. Hall minimized the effects of Mr. C.'s work injury on his ability to 
return to work Mr. Hall concluded that Mr. C. might be able to obtain medium-to-light duty 
employment as an assembly worker, bench welder, or welding and fabrication worker. Mr. Hall also 
recommended that Mr. C. undergo further assessment and diagnostic evaluation. 
Judge Sims received the foregoing evidence in an evidentiary hearing held during February, 
1998. On May 11, 1998, Judge Sims issued his decision concluding, among other things, that Mr. 
C. was entitled to a preliminary finding of permanent total disability, subject to Renco's statutory 
right to submit a reemployment plan reasonably designed to return Mr. C. to work, and request a 
hearing on such plan. 
Thereafter, the parties engaged in what may fairly be described as a protracted, litigious and 
contradictory course of conduct relative to the preparation, submission and implementation of a 
reemployment/rehabilitation plan. Among the salient shortcomings of this process was Renco's 
failure to submit and obtain Commission approval of any comprehensive written plan defining the 
parties' respective rights, obligations and goals. The reemployment/rehabilitation process 
degenerated into an ad hoc effort involving a large number of different individuals, none of whom 
was aware of all important details and considerations. 
To the extent any of the various "reemployment plans" contained objective requirements that 
were adequately communicated to Mr. C , he complied with such plans. None of the plans resulted 
in actual employment for Mr. C 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Issues raised by Renco's motion for review can be grouped into two categories. The first 
category includes Renco's challenges to the underlying compensability of Mr. C.'s claim and his 
right to a preliminary determination of permanent total disability. The second category includes 
issues related to the interpretation and application of the §67's reemployment/rehabilitation 
provisions, including Renco's constitutional arguments. The Appeals Board addresses each 
category below. 
Compensability of claim/ preliminary finding of permanent total disability. Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act provides medical and wage replacement benefits to workers injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment. Thus, before an applicant can receive any of the 
benefits provided by the Act, the applicant must prove that the injury: 1) occurred by accident; 2) 
arose out of employment; and 3) arose in the course of employment. Renco concedes Mr. C.'s injury 
was accidental and in the course of employment, but contests Judge Sims' conclusion that the 
accident also "arose out o f employment. 
In response to Renco's argument, Mr. C. contends the Appeals Board cannot consider the 
foregoing issue because Renco did not file a timely motion for review of Judge Sims' decision. 
However, Judge Sims' decision failed to advise Renco of its right to file a motion for review. For 
that reason, Renco did not file a motion for review of Judge Sims' order, but instead waited until 
Judge Eblen issued her final order in this matter on September 28, 2001. Renco then filed a 
comprehensive motion for review of both Judge Sims' interim order and Judge Eblen's final order. 
Section 34A-2-801(3)(a) of the Act and §63-46b-12(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA") permit a party to obtain review of an ALJ's decision by filing a motion for 
review within 30 days of the issuance of the decision. A timely motion for review is a prerequisite 
for the Appeals Board's jurisdiction. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 
944 (Utah App. 1993.) However, §63-46b-10(l)(a) of UAPA also requires that the ALJ's decision 
must include "a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved partiesQ" The Utah Court of Appeals has held that an agency's failure to comply with the 
notice requirements of §63-46b-10( 1 )(a) is presumed to substantially prejudice the rights of the party 
entitled to such notice so as to require remedial action by the agency. Krantz v. Utah Dept. of 
Commerce. 856 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah App. 1993). 
Because Renco was not given notice of its right to request agency review of Judge Sims' 
decision, and in light of §63-46b-10(l)(a)'s requirement for such notice, the Appeals Board 
concludes that the 30 day period to request agency review was tolled from the date of Judge Sims' 
decision until September 28, 2001, when Judge Eblen issued her final order and advised Renco of 
its appeal rights. Consequently, Renco's motion for review filed October 26, 2001, is timely. The 
Appeals Board will proceed to consider the merits of Renco's arguments. 
The Appeals Board now turns to the question of whether Mr. C.'s injury arose out of his 
employment at Renco. In Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted Professor Larson's proposal that the "arising out o f requirement be 
subdivided into two components--"legal causation" and "medical causation." The Allen Court 
explained this analytical framework as follows: 
(Professor) Larson suggests that compensable injuries can best be identified 
by first considering the legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause. (Citation 
omitted.) "Under the legal test, the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies 
the test of 'arising out of the employment' . . . (then) the doctors must say whether 
the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact 
caused this (injury)." (Citing Larson). 
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as follows: 
Under Allen, an usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with 
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant 
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment 
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." . . . . The requirement of 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" is designed to screen out those injuries that result 
from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from 
exertions required of the employee in the workplace. (Citations omitted.) 
At the time of his accident of September 8, 1994, Mr. C. suffered from pre-existing facet 
joint hypertrophy and spinal stenosis that was unrelated to his work These preexisting conditions 
combined with the work-related disc herniations to necessitate his surgery. Because Mr. C. suffered 
from preexisting conditions that contributed to the injuries for which he now seeks benefits, he must 
satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation by establishing that his 
workplace exertion was unusual or extraordinary when compared to typical exertions of modern 
nonemployment life. 
In order to determine whether Mr. C.'s workplace exertion satisfies the more stringent prong 
of the Allen test for legal causation, the Appeal Board must first determine which of Mr. C.'s 
exertions at work on September 8, 1994, are relevant. On September 8, 1994, Mr. C. lifted, carried 
and cut 60 bricks in a three hour period. Renco contends the Appeals Board should judge whether 
Mr. C.'s exertion was unusual or extraordinary by focusing only on the exertion involved in lifting 
the final brick, and disregard his earlier, more substantial exertions. 
The Appeals Board has carefully reviewed the record on this point and concludes that Mr. 
C.'s injury was the climax of his exertions throughout the morning, rather than the result of lifting 
a single brick. Consequently, all of Mr. C.'s exertions on the day of his accident must be considered. 
In that context, the Appeals Board concludes that Mr. C.'s exertion in lifting, carrying and cutting 
60 bricks, each weighing 35 pounds, was unusual and extraordinary when compared to typical 
modern nonemployment exertions. The Appeals Board therefore concludes that Mr. C. has satisfied 
the test for legal causation and that his injury arose out of employment at Renco. As such, it is 
compensable under Utah's workers' compensation system. 
The next issue before the Appeals Board is whether Mr. C. has established his right to a 
preliminary determination of permanent total disability compensation. Mr. C.'s claim must be 
evaluated according to the law in effect on September 8,1994, the date of his accident. At that time, 
§35-1-67(1) of the Act provided as follows: 
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations as revised. 
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520(b), (c), (c), (e) and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
Pursuant to the foregoing directive, the Commission adopted Rule R612-1-10.B, Utah 
Administrative Code. Among other provisions, Rule R612-1-10.B.1. authorizes use of the Social 
Security Administration's determination of disability under Title 20 C.F.R. in lieu of repeating the 
disability determination process for workers' compensation purposes. The rule also sets out the 
particular elements established by Title 20 C.F.R. for evaluating permanent total disability. Among 
these elements are the requirements that the claimant's industrial accident is a significant cause of 
the disability and that the disability prevents the claimant from doing other work. 
The Social Security Administration has already determined that Mr. C. meets the standards 
for permanent disability established by Title 20 CFR. As permitted by the Commission's Rule 
R612-1-10.B.l, the Appeals Board finds that Mr. C. has therefore established his right to a 
preliminary finding of permanent total disability for workers' compensation purposes. However, the 
Appeals Board will also consider Renco's specific arguments regarding the cause of Mr. C.'s 
disability and his ability to do other work. 
Renco contends the findings of fact contained in Judge Sims' decision of May 11,1998, were 
inadequate to support his determination that Mr. C.'s was entitled to a preliminary finding of 
permanent total disability. Whether or not Judge Sims' findings were inadequate, the Appeals Board 
has set forth its own findings on the subject. Those findings conclude that the vocational report 
prepared by the State Office of Rehabilitation, together with Mr. C.'s own testimony, are persuasive 
regarding the effect of Mr. C.'s work-related injuries on his ability to work. 
Renco also argues that Mr. C.'s work accident of September, 1994, is not a significant cause 
of his disability and that his claim for disability benefits should be attributed to the first accident he 
suffered at Renco, during 1989. However, the medical evidence establishes that Mr. C. incurred a 
5% whole person impairment from the second (1994) accident. Such an impairment is substantial 
in its own right. Furthermore, up to the time of the 1994 accident, Mr. C. was able to perform his 
job at Renco; afterwards he could not. The Appeals Board concludes that Mr. C.'s work accident 
of September 1994 was a significant cause of his disability and properly serves as the basis for his 
current claim of permanent total disability. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the injuries for which Mr. C. seeks workers' 
compensation benefits are compensable under the Act. The Appeals Board further concludes Mr. 
C. cannot perform other work and that his injuries from the 1994 accident are a significant cause of 
his disability. The Appeals Board therefore affirms Judge Sims' preliminary finding that Mr. C. is 
permanently and totally disabled, subject to Renco's right to propose a reemployment/rehabilitation 
plan. 
Interpretation, application and constitutionality of reemployment/rehabilitation provisions. 
Renco contends §35-1-67 of the Act does not require it to submit its reemployment plan for Mr. C. 
to the Labor Commission for approval. This argument has been considered and rejected by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Color Country Management v. Labor Commission. Utah Court of Appeals Case 
No. 200001019, filed December 6, 2001. The Appeals Board therefore concludes that Renco was 
required to submit its reemployment plan to the AU for approval before implementing the plan. 
Next, Renco contends that Judge Switzer and Judge Eblen approved Renco's reemployment 
plans for Mr. C . The record is confused on this issue. But having reviewed the record, it appears 
that much of the confusion was caused by Renco's erroneous belief that it was free to devise 
and substitute reemployment plans at will. As a result, the only plans that were approved by the 
ALJs were vague proposals for "direct placement" with no clear definition of the parties' respective 
roles or expectations. Instead of the confused and inadequate procedures used in this case, Renco 
should have followed the steps outlined by §35-1-67 for implementation of a reemployment plan. 
Those steps are: 1) Notice to the ALJ and injured worker of intent to develop a reemployment plan; 
2) Development of the plan; 3) Presentation of the plan to the ALJ, either by hearing or stipulation 
of the parties; and 4) Approval and implementation of the plan. 
Even if the Appeals Board were to conclude that Renco's "direct placement" plan was 
properly authorized and implemented, the Appeals Board concludes that such plan has been 
unsuccessful in rehabilitating or reemploying Mr. C . Mr. C. has complied with the objective 
requirements of such plan. As to the subjective aspects of such a plan, the Appeals Board is not 
convinced that Mr. C.'s attitudes amounted to a failure to cooperate with the plan, particularly in 
view of the plan's lack of definition and the frequent changes of personnel involved in implementing 
the plan. 
As to Renco's constitutional challenges to §35-1-67, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
considered and rejected those arguments in Color Country Management v. Labor Commission. Id. 
Summary. The Appeals Board concludes that Mr. C. suffered a compensable work-
related accident while employed by Renco on September 8, 1994. Asa result of his injuries from 
such accident, together with other work and non-work conditions, Mr. C. was permanently and 
totally disabled. Renco has failed to implement a successful plan to rehabilitate or reemploy Mr. C . 
Mr. C. has satisfied his obligation to cooperate with Renco's reemployment/rehabilitation efforts. 
Mr. C. is, therefore, entitled to a final determination of permanent total disability and a final award 
of permanent total disability compensation. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated herein, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Sims' determination of May 
11,1998, that Mr. C. was entitled to a preliminary determination of permanent total disability under 
the Act. Also for the reasons stated herein, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Eblen's conclusion of 
September 28, 2001, that Mr. C. is now entitled to a final award of permanent 
